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Protecting the Whole • - A Review
Phebian N. 8ewajt
Introduction
he aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis marked a turning point in
financial system regulation, generating a "renewed" interest among global
regulators in the use of macroprudential policy to promote financial system
stability. In this regard, the article discussed some shortcomings of traditional
regulation and promoted the need for a broader and systemic approach to
financial system stability using both traditional (micro-prudential) and nontraditional (macroprudential) policies. The paper further discussed the elements
of macroprudential policy and tools used to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities in the
financial system. A summary of the article is presented in section II and comments
are highlighted in section Ill.
I.

T

II.
O verview of Artic le
The article explained the deficiency of traditional "microprudential" regulation in
guaranteeing the health of the financial system and thus, considered it as narrow
in approach. First, it focuses only on the individually sound institutions. Second, it
focuses less on financial institutions that operate in wholesale markets such as
investment banks; and third, it neglects the possibility that an action considered
as prudent behavior by one financial institution may indeed constitute a systemic
problem when all financial institutions engage in similar actions-the herding
approach. These seemingly drawbacks of traditional regulation was cited as one
of the contributing factors to the global financial crisis that engulfed the world in
2007, which led to a growing interest in a more systematic and broader
approach to financial system regulation.
Consequently, macroprudential
regulation has been considered as an additional and complementary tool to
traditional financial system regulation, which is adapted to identify and counter
growing risks and vulnerabilities such as credit, market, liquidity and systemic risks
in the financial system. This enables regulators to minimize disruption in the
provision of financial services and maintain financial stability. In practice,
macroprudential policies include, but are not limited to the dynamic capital
buffer, dynamic provisions, loan-to-value ratios, variation in sectoral risk weights,
liquidity requirements, capital-risk weighted ratios and measures targeted at
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foreign currency lending. The dynamic capital buffer requires financial institutions
to build-up their regulatory capital above required levels in periods of "unusually
strong credit growth", or boom periods, which would allow such institutions to
withstand or minimize losses in burst periods. Also known as countercyclical
capital buffer, they are designed to minimize the boom and burst troughs in the
business c ycles. Similarly, dynamic provisioning requires financial institutions to
make higher provision for loans in the period of boom and low provision in the
period of slow business activities. Unlike the standard loan provisioning, these loan
provisions are made in boom periods characterized by high loan repayments
and low credit losses so that in burst periods, the "banks' balance sheet are
better prepared to absorb losses" . Differential sectoral risk weights are designed
to ensure institutions make additional capital provision to cover loans in sectors
with excessive risks. In this regard, the authors cited the Turkish example where
there now exist stricter requirement for new lending to household sector to curb
growing loan growth in that sector. Loan-to-value ratio simply refers to the
creation of loans below the value of a property. In other words, it limits the "loan
amount to well below the value of the property". According to the authors, this is
often applied in the real estate market and complements the debt-to-income
ratios, which limits the proportion of household income, spent on debt servicing.
Liquidity requirements 'coerce' institutions to increase buffers of liquid assets
during boom periods which can be drawn down in burst times. The authors cited
examples of countries that have introduced such measures as New Zealand and
Korea. Measures targeted at foreign currency lending include portfolio limits on
foreign currency lending and loan-to-value ratios for foreign currency loans. The
authors, however, decried that recent emphasis by the Financial Stability Board
on these tools have been directed only towards the "too big to fail" institutions
and therefore urged for more attention to individually systemic bank and nonbank financial institutions. One such example includes financial institutions in the
derivative market.
Having espoused some macroprudential tools, the authors stressed the need for
international cooperation not only to minimize regulatory arbitrage, but also for
the simple reason that domestic asset bubbles can be fed by foreign credit. They
also advocated for the existence of institutional frameworks and the design of
analytical frameworks to assess systemic risks to ensure effective macroprudential
policies. While acknowledging the need for macroprudential policies to account
for country specific circumstances, the authors noted that any designated
institution should have a clear mandate to take prompt action to minimize the
buildup of risks in the financial system. In addition, governments must be
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supportive through its legislative policies in order to minimize systemic risks. For
instance, political considerations and institutional arrangements sometime limit
the deployment of macroprudential instruments which could jeopardize the
stability of the financial system. Developing a system for early identification of
systemic risks was also considered as an important element of effective
macroprudential policy. In this regard, effective monitoring of several indicators
of credit, market and liquidity risks as well as concentration in any sector should
form part of the analytical toolkit suc h that the appropriate policy to address
these growing risks is deployed. In conclusion, the authors reiterated the
complementary role of macroprudential policy in the realm of monetary and
fiscal policies. They pointed out the existing trade-offs between enhancing the
stability and efficiency of the financial system in supporting economic growth.
Thus, they stressed the need for an appropriate balance between benefits and
costs of enhancing financial stability which often entails difficult judgments.
Ill. Comments
It is common knowledge that the world 's view of stable monetary and financial
conditions was threatened by the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, caused by a
lax in financial system regulation and supervision (Canuto, 2011 ; Svensson, 20 l 0) .

Consequently, the traditional focus of central banking has been expanded to
financ ial stability. Indeed, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act in the United States stresses
the importance of a regulatory framework to preserve financial stability in almost
every section of the financial services industry with strong emphasis on taming the
buildup of potential public liability fro m the failure of systemically important
financial institutions (SIFls). In most emerging market economies, including Nigeria,
macro-prudential as a policy tool is not entirely a new phenomenon. In Nigeria,
the Financial Services Coordinating Committee, (FSCC) l was setup in April 1994
as a formal platform with the aim of coordinating regula tory issues and concerns
for the purpose of achieving financial stability and minimizing conflicts between
prudential regulations. This platform, similar to the Financial Stability Oversight
Council in US (created by Dodd-Frank Act) and recently the Financial Policy
Committee within the Bank of England in United Kingdom provided institutional
arrangement for anchoring financial system stability in Nigeria. Also, the structure

1

The committee has evolved over the years. In Moy 1994, the name of the C ommittee was c hanged
to Financial Services Regulation Coord inating Committee /FSRCC), a ccorded legal status b y the 1998
amendment to Sec tion 38 of the C BN Act 1991 and formally ina ugurated b y the Governor of the CBN
in May 1999. Its members hove a lso evolved to recently include the Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria
Deposit Insurance Corpora tion, Federal Ministry of Finance, Corpora te Affairs Commission, Na tional
Insuranc e Commission, and Sec urities and Exc hange Commission. See http://www.fsrcc.gov.ng/ourhistory.html for details.
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a nd composition of the FSRCC appears to have conferred the mandate of
financial stability to all financial and non-financial regulating entities whose
actions can impart on financial stability. Though this structure encourages
cooperation and c oordination among regulators, the issue of who takes ultimate
or explicit responsibility for systemic risk could be a source of concern 2 • For
instance, hitherto in England there was a tripartite structure between the Bank of
England, the Financial Services Authority and the Treasury which shared the task
of maintaining financial stability, but no institution was clearly responsible. It was
not until April 2013 that the Bank of England, through legislation3, was entrusted
with the financial stability mandate which led to the establishment of the
Financial Policy Committee within the Bank to 'monitor and respond to systemic
risks' . Similar to Brazil, there is an active use of both monetary and
macro prudential tools in Nigeria to achieve polic y objectives. The Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) is empowered by the 2007 CBN Act and Banks and Other Financial
Institutions Act (BOFIA) to, and largely through its banking supervision, consumer
protection and recently financial policy and regulation departments examine
growing risks that c ould affect the efficient functioning of the financial system.
Regulatory frameworks, policy guidelines and memorandum are also designed
specific ally to enhance prudential (macro & micro) supervision of the financial
institutions to prevent the build-up of risks. Other key institutional arrangements
include the public ation of a half yearly financial stability report.
Macroprudential policy toolkits and its effects often vary depending on the
e c onomic conditions, reflecting the dynamics of the domestic financial system.
Typical examples of macro-prudential tools deployed by the Central Bank of
Nigeria include restrictions on loan-to-deposit ratio; liquidity ratio; cash reserve
ratio; capital adequacy requirements; limits on borrowing, risk weights, corporate
governanc e measures and disclosure requirements. The effectiveness of these
policy tools vary, depending on the type of risks and their evolution. For instance,
loan-to-deposit and liquidity ratios which are tools aimed at stemming excessive
c redit growth in some sec tors or products and ensuring that banks are very liquid,
do have their shortcomings. Loan-to-deposit (LD) ratio is computed as total loans
as a ratio of total deposits, while liquidity ratio is prescribed as specified liquid
assets a s a proportion of deposit liabilities. Currently, the prescribed LD ratio for

2 Countries ad opt a suite of superv;sory strateg;es, ranging from single supervisory model, sectoral
superv;sory model and/or tw;n peaks superv;sory models. These models either confer a c ollective
accountability or single accountability for financial sector institutions eac h with its benefits and
challenges. See Kim /2012)
3 The 2013 UK Legislation also created the Prudential Regulation Authority as a subsidiary of the Bank of
England with the responsibility for micro-prudential reg ulation and the establishment of a Financial
Conduct Authority to 'reg ulate financial firms' conduct and protect consumers.
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deposit money banks is a maximum limit of 80 per c ent•. Put simply, for every
N l 00 deposit of bank "A", it is permissible for bank "A" to create loans to a
maximum of N80 per NlO0. The counter argument suggests that bank "A" is only
liquid to a tune of N20 assuming that (i) it exhausts its lending capacity up to the
approved benchmark (ii) there do not exist other non-interest income. Assuming
that a depositor requires l 00 per cent of his deposit5, banks become more
exposed to higher liquidity risks. Suc h liquidity challenges, coupled with structural
factors, often mean higher interest and in an environment where interest rates
are on the average 23 per cent, a puzzling question is; who borrows money at an
average of 23 per cent? The emphasis is on the "who". In an economy where
over 70 per cent of the country's revenue is derived from oil. the question
remains; how much of Nigeria's population are engaged in oil productive
activities? Statistics is not readily available. The guess, however, is only a very few
are involved. In an attempt to identify the 'who' , an analysis of sectoral credit by
banks indicates that between 2010 and 2013, an average of 45 per cent of credit
were channeled towards the "less preferred sector" with "finance and insurance"
and "import and domestic trade" sub-sectors accounting for the larger share. In
practice, actual loan-to-deposit ratio have hovered around 40 percentage
points below the prescribed target of 80 perc ent6, leaving banks with more
liquidity and more room for credit expansion. Perhaps, this is one factor that has
led to the allusions of excess liquidity in the system. For instance, cash reserve
ratio (CRR) on public sector deposits was inc reased in January 2014 from 50 to 75
per cent to stem excess liquidity. Notwithstanding the measures taken, a forward looking thought process would be to provide answers to questions such as; are
there limits of macroprudential policy beyond which they become less effective
at stabilizing the financial system?. If such limits d o exist, are they easily
disc ernible? At the moment, there are no clear theoretic al or empirical answers
to some critical macroprudential questions, which this question is one of them.
Most literature argue for the mutual relationship between monetary policy and
macroprudential polic y. In Nigeria, the monetary polic y anchor is the monetary
4 The 2007 increase in LD ratio to 80 per cent was announced to constrain c redit growth. This eroded
the excess liq uidity which bank faced prior to the global financial crisis la rgely due to the 2005
mandatory re-capitalization of DMBs.
5 Though the introd uction of the 3-tiered KYC re quirement which eliminates the requirement for a
minimum opening amount on all accounts can encoura ge this act, it is highly unlikely as this c an only
happen in a very extreme situation as all depositors would hardly come a t the same time to d emand
100 p er cent of their deposits which often include term deposits and wholesale and retail deposits, /i.e
inter-bank takings}.
6 As a t January 20 14, Loa n-to-dep osit ratio was 54 per cent signaling a build up in c redit c rea ting
capacity of banks. It has been suggested tha t this increase has not been inflationary. This adds
momentum to the perception that since these excesses are not chasing 'too few goods', they are
being channeled to 'sate ha vens' - currencies or favourable interest rote on deposits.
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policy rate which serves as a signaling guide for other money market rates. Since
2012, the "Monetary Policy Rate {MPR) has been retained at 12.00 per cent with a
symmetric corridor of+/- 200 basis points, thus effectively maintaining the SLF and
SDF rates at 14.00 and 10.00 per cent, respectively". While the SDF serves one
purpose of automatically draining excess liquidity from the system, it also provides
a floor for short-term interest rates. A typical scenario is such that Bank "A"
sources for funds mainly through deposits. These funds are sourced for a weighted
average rate of about 2.5 to 7 per cent say for savings or term deposits,
respectively. In other words, for every N 100, the " depositor" is compensated with
N3 in the case of a savings deposit for parting with his funds and with a maximum
LD rate of 80 percent, Bank "A" can either lend to a maximum tune of N80, take
advantage of the symmetric interest rate corridor by placing funds at the Central
Bank of Nigeria at 10 percent, purchase treasury securities or do both while
looking for other investment outlets. An analysis of standing facilities indicates
that the deposit component grew by 40 per cent between 2011 and 2012. The
design of the rate around a symmetric corridor creates arbitrage opportunities for
banks as it encourages placements of deposits at the central bank by banks
seeking to advantage of the symmetric nature of the corridor. With an SDF rate of
10 per cent, the incentive for earning risk free interest income is high, thus
constraining inter-bank lending and credit creation . This regulatory arbitrage
necessitated the increase of CRR on public sector deposits to 75 per cent.
Nevertheless, transactions in the uncollaterized segment of the inter-bank market
have been largely minimal or non-existent with the introduction of the symmetric
interest rate corridor. Professor Abdul-Ganiyu Garbo, a Monetary Policy
Committee member captured this succinctly in the MPC communique of March,
2014 that, "an SDF rate of 10 per cent has been progressively crowding out the
inter-bank market". The counter argument for retaining on SDF of this magnitude
has been the likelihood that excess liquidity following a declining adjustment to
the SDF would exert undue pressure on the foreign exchange market. Whichever
side of the argument one holds sends a signal of the weight attached to these
issues, which further reiterates Jacome and Nier (2012) suggestion of the need to
ensure an appropriate balance between promoting stability and efficiency of
the financial system, with due consideration of the benefits and costs of policy
options.
In a bid to minimize systemic risk, regulated financial institutions should be bound
by " comply or explain" principle that ensures their compliance or an explanation
of their decision not to comply with a regulation. The operational framework of
monetary policy will also need to be reconsidered to account for the dynamic
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pace of financial market innovations and lessons learnt from the global financial
crisis. For instance, the liquidity management framework could be reviewed such
that required modifications during normal and crisis times are pre-identified
through early warning exercise and other macroprudential tools. The range of
financial indicators with possible macroprudential implications should also be
broadened. In a review of the publication, 'How might financial market
information be used for supervisory purposes?, Omanukwue (2005) stressed the
need for central bank supervisors to observe stock market data as a
complementary information in surveillance activities. It was not until May 2010
that the central bank introduced a limit on capital market lending to a proportion
of banks' balance sheet. Thus, there is an increasing need to integrate features of
financial sector distortions not only in existing modeling and forecasting
frameworks, but also in the risk-based supervisory frameworks. It, however,
remains cogent for supervisors to understand 'if and how market signals can be
used' and this border on interpretability and existence of laid down procedures.
In addition, in the process of banks' abiding to the principles of pillar 3 of the
Basel II accord, there is need to minimize the public stigma often associated with
banks' borrowing from the standing lending facilities, especially during crisis times.
There is also a growing need to build capacity in the area of macroprudential
analysis for the financial system.
The Nigerian financial market is largely dominated by banks. However, in view of
the evolving architecture of the Nigerian financial system currently characterized
by the growing role of non-bank and non-deposit financial institutions-stock
brokerage and pension funds, there is an increasing imperative to coordinate the
different regulatory and supervisory activities such that regulatory gaps and
leakages are minimized and also to continuously re-examine existing regulatory
and supervisory frameworks while taking into account the cost of financial
regulation as well as the extent of financial market integration. Furthermore, the
design of macroprudential indicators should account for country specific factors.
Some key considerations include developments in the domestic and international
capital markets, trends in the capital account of the balance of payments of an
economy, structural factors such as the ownership structure, size and exposures of
the financial system, which should all feed into macroprudential analysis. The
quest for supremacy between monetary and macroprudential policy seems to
have resolved itself as the consensus in the literature considers macroprudential
policy not as a substitute for monetary policy but a complement. Thus, there
should be a policy mix between these two policies and just as monetary policy
could be used to minimize financial sector distortions, using macroprudential
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instruments to achieve growth and inflation objectives can be costly and
inefficient. While the experiences of the 2007 global financial crisis has clearly
tilted monetary policy making towards financial stability, maintaining that culture
requires painstaking efforts without sacrificing the price stability objective at the
altar of financial system stability. Balancing the benefits and costs between
financial stability and efficiency remains an art which often requires difficult
judgments in policy design and implementation.
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